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NOTE, THROWING A MONKEY WRENCH
INTO THE WHEELS OF INTERNATIONAL




Since World War Two, American banks have greatly expanded
their foreign operations. I As the scope of United States political, mili-
tary, and economic influence stretched into both familiar and unfamil-
iar lands, American financial institutions followed. 2 During this
expansion, U.S. banks initially concentrated their efforts in Western
Europe and the industrialized countries of the Pacific Rim. 3 As com-
petition with foreign banking institutions increased, however, Ameri-
can banks seeking new markets moved into developing nations.4
Unfortunately for the American financial community, as the United
States and its allies suffered from military and economic reversals, so
did U.S. banks. In Cuba, Vietnam, Mexico, and other Third World
nations, governments seized bank assets and restricted bank opera-
tions, resulting in much litigation.5 Litigants have contended that for-
* University of Michigan Law School; Class of 1991.
1. U.S. commercial banks opened their first overseas office in 1887. P. OPPENHEIM, INTER-
NATIONAL BANKING 20 (5th ed. 1987). By 1950, 7 member banks of the Federal Reserve System
had 95 overseas branches. U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 37th Annual
Report 32 (1950). In 1960, 8 member banks controlled 124 foreign branches. U.S. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 47th Annual Report 93 (1960). As of December 31,
1988, 147 member banks operated more than 854 branches outside U.S. borders. U.S. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 75th Annual Report 178 (1988).
2. See P. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 20 (stating that U.S. banks now have branches in
almost every foreign market).
3. As of 1984, U.S. banks maintain one third of their 2,246 foreign offices in the Federal
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Belgium,
and Spain. About fifteen percent of American foreign offices operate in Hong Kong, Australia,
and Japan. Hicks, Citicorp Has Largest Foreign Banking Network, Am. Banker, Oct. 24, 1984, at
2, col. 1.
4. Note, Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks - A Proposal for Partial Suspension During Periods
of Unrest, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 118, 119 (1983) [hereinafter Partial Suspension] (describing the
expansion of American banks abroad); see Trigaux, 1913 Act Unleashed Banks from U.S. Shores,
Am. Banker, July 28, 1983, at 8, col. 1 (describing U.S. banking operations in less developed
countries).
5. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611
(1983) (involving the right to set off claims for expropriated assets against the Cuban govern-
ment); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs
demanded repayment in New York for deposits in South Vietnamese branch after the North
1039
Michigan Journal of International Law
eign countries have limited the outflow of their currencies, have
greatly devalued exchange rates, and have outright expropriated the
bank branch and its assets. Recent cases have focused on these and
related issues, including choice of law and foreign affairs questions.
The United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., a case which poses the ques-
tion of which law governs transactions involving "Eurodollars," or
U.S. dollars carried in banking institutions outside of the United
States.6 The case also provides the High Court with the opportunity
to adopt a uniform approach to foreign bank branch liability cases.
7
Facially, it resembles previous cases: a Third World government's ac-
tions (a Philippine banking regulation) prevent an American bank
from honoring a deposit request. Still, while Wells Fargo raises inter-
esting issues similar to those raised in earlier cases, the Court's deci-
sion in this case could have more far-reaching effects. First, a
resolution of this case could force the Eurodollar banking system to
shift from its currently informal transactional methods to a more
mechanical and less flexible process.8 Second, the Court could use the
case to end the current conflicts as to whether and how the Federal
Courts of Appeals should consider the Act of State doctrine in deter-
mining the proper situs test for cases involving actions by foreign gov-
ernments that affect intangible assets.9
This note attempts to illustrate concisely the issues and potential
ramifications of Wells Fargo. After describing the complex factual and
procedural histories of the case, the note briefly surveys the various
approaches to the Act of State doctrine and suggests that the Court
Vietnamese takeover of Saigon), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764
F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving drastic change in Mexican exchange rates after Mexican
government's nationalization of banks); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1965) (Iraqi government sought the assets of deceased Iraqi King Faisal II, whose assets
it claimed to have expropriated), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 757
F.2d 516 (U.S. banks sued for repayment of debt owed by Costa Rican banks, who claimed that
their ability to pay was precluded by Costa Rican government's suspension of all debt repay-
ments), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
6. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
7. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110 S.
Ct. 537 (Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 88-1260).
8. The Eurodollar interbank lending market is mostly undocumented. Usually, dealers ar-
range transactions for banks by means of telephone or telex communications, followed by an
exchange of confirmations between the banks involved. R. WEISWEILLER, MANAGING A FOR-
EIGN EXCHANGE DEPARTMENT 3 (1985).
9. See Comment, The Continued Viability of the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign Branch
Bank Expropriation Cases, 3 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 99, 127 (1988) [hereinafter Foreign
Branch Expropriation] (noting that the current disagreement among and within the Federal
Courts of Appeals on the appropriate situs determination test leads to disparate results and pro-
motes forum shopping).
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should consider Act of State issues in Wells Fargo. Next, it examines
the lower courts' analyses of the case and what effects their rulings
would have if the Court were to adopt them. Due to the resulting
legal confusion that the lower courts' decisions would wreak on the
Eurodollar community, Wells Fargo should not remain as precedent.
Currently, Wells Fargo would subject these deposits to the laws of
New York. The Court should reject the lower courts' narrow reason-
ing and instead decide Wells Fargo in light of the Act of State issues
involved, especially by addressing questions of debt situs determina-
tion raised by previous cases. Upon examination of the various ap-
proaches to debt situs determination, the Court should adopt the
incidents of the debt test, an approach that is both more equitable to
bank expropriation cases and more consistent with the tenets of the
Act of State doctrine. Since banks have always assumed that Eurodol-
lar deposits are situated, or have their "situs," in the host country of a
branch office, the situs of the debt in Wells Fargo should be Manila.
Philippine law would then decide the case. Yet, even if Philippine law
were to govern the outcome of Wells Fargo, plaintiff Wells Fargo Asia
Limited ("WFAL") might still prevail.
II. FACTS
Wells Fargo Asia Limited operates as a Singapore-based subsidiary
of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the San Francisco-based bank.' 0 With
operations that span the globe, Citibank, N.A., ranks as the largest
bank in the United States."I On June 10, 1983, Citibank's branch of-
fice in Manila ("Citibank/Manila") informed an independent broker,
Astley & Pearce, that it wanted to borrow U.S. dollars that day via the
interbank lending market. Through oral negotiations with Astley &
Pearce,12  WFAL placed two six-month non-negotiable U.S.
$1,000,000 deposits with Citibank/Manila.13 These deposits were to
earn ten percent interest and to mature six months later on December
9 and 10, 1983.14 At the time of deposit, deposits made in domestic
U.S. banks received 8.85 percent interest, while Eurodollar deposits
10. As of June 30, 1988, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., was the eighth largest commercial bank in
the United States, with $33,328,533,000 in deposits. 1989 AMERICAN BANKER ToP NUMBERS
12.
11. In the same survey, Citibank, N.A., stood as America's largest commercial bank, with
$104,888,000,000 in deposits. Id.
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made with Citibank's various worldwide offices received ten percent.' 5
Through its inquiry with Astley & Pearce, Citibank/Manila had
reentered the Eurodollar interbank lending market to obtain funds.'
6
The global Eurodollar interbank market serves at least four goals for
banks. First, it operates as an efficient market system enabling funds
to flow from investors to investment opportunities. Second, it allows
banks to buy and sell currencies to hedge their foreign exchange and
exposure risks. Third, the market functions as a source of lending
funds when banks need to adjust their balance sheets. Finally, the
market allows banks to avoid the United States banking regulatory
system. 17 Today, Eurodollar transactions have become an increasing
part of the daily business of major international banks, including
WFAL and Citibank/Manila.
The written documentation of the parties' Eurodollar transaction
consisted of several confirmations and computer-generated telex
messages sent among themselves and the independent broker. Finan-
cial institutions typically make Eurodollar transactions'in this manner,
relying heavily on practice and undocumented contacts.' 8 The bro-
ker's telexed confirmation stated that payment was to be made to "Ci-
tibank, N.A., New York Account Manila." Repayment was to go to
"Wells Fargo International, New York Account.. .. " 19 On June 14,
15. During litigation, both parties agreed that one reason for this difference was that banks
operating overseas did not have to comply with reserve requirements imposed by the Federal
Reserve Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on banks operating in the United
States. Id. See 35 Fed. Reg. 2768 (1970) (stating that this exemption was necessary to promote
the competitiveness of foreign branches); Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12
C.F.R. §§ 204.1-124 (1989). The Federal Reserve Board has reaffirmed that principle in recent
opinions. Deposits Payable Outside United States - Guarantee by U.S. Bank, 1 Fed. Res. Reg.
Serv. 2-330.1 (Staff Op. July 29, 1983); Deposits Payable Outside the United States - CD
Issued in United States, I Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 2-521.1 (Staff Op. Mar. 21, 1983).
16. "Eurodollar" deposits commonly refer to deposits denominated in U.S. dollars carried by
a banking institution located outside of the United States. J. GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS 14 (1986). More accurately, WFAL's deposits should be termed "Asiadollars,"
as they were U.S. dollars traded in the Eurocurrency market operating around the money center
of Singapore. See R. WEISWEILLER, supra note 8, at 99. The district court also described these
Asia-based deposits as "Asiadollars." Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F.Supp. 351,
352 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinafter Wells Fargo I].
17. Saunders, The Eurocurrency Interbank Market: Potential for International Crises?, Bus.
REV., Jan./Feb. 1988, at 18 (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).
18. Documentation for Eurodollar deposits may not contain an express choice of law clause;
any express terms are stated in the telex communications and later confirmed by mail. Such telex
communications usually contain only the identity and location of the borrower and lender; the
amount, interest rate and maturity date of the deposit, and, on occasion, payment instructions on
maturity. Hoffman & Deming, The Role of U.S. Courts in the Transnational Flow of Funds, 17
N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L L. & POL. 493, 499 (1985) [hereinafter Transnational Flow].
19. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 354. The full text reads:
Borrower: Citibank, N.A. Manila
Lender: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., Singapore
We hereby confirm having negotiated the following deposit/placement on your behalf:
Note, Wells Fargo v. Citibank
WFAL confirmed the deposit and instructed Wells Fargo/New York
to pay to Citibank/New York the deposit amount, thus paying the
deposit through its New York offices. This followed normal procedure
for dollar-denominated Eurodollar transactions.
20
Telexes accompanied the confirmations. Citibank/Manila's telex
stated:
Please remit US Dlr 1,000,000 to our account with Citibank New York.
At maturity we remit US Dlr 1,049,444.44 to your account with Wells
Fargo Bank Intl Corp NY through Citibank New York.
21
WFAL's telex read:
We shall instruct Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York our correspondent
please pay to our a/c with Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York to pay to
Citibank NA customer's correspondent USD 1,000,000.22
Astley & Pearce's confirmation stated:
Settlement - Citibank NA NYC AC Manila
Repayment - Wells Fargo Bk Intl NYC Ac Wells Fargo Asia Ltd
Sgp No 003-023645.23
These telexes which were sent among the parties and the broker,
along with a statement of "Terms and Conditions" sent by Citibank/




From: 14-06-83 To: 09-12-83
Pay: Citibank, N.A. New York Account Manila
Repay: Wells Fargo International, New York
Account: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., Singapore
Account # 003-023645
(the second telex message was identical, except that the term was 181 days and the maturity date
was Dec. 12, 1983)
A telex sent by Astley & Pearce to Wells Fargo similarly stated:
We confirm having arranged the following for your account and risk -
Principal: US$1,000,000
Rate: 10
From: 14/06/83 To: 9/12/83
14/06/83 12/12/83
Instructions:
Settlement - Citibank NA NYC Ac Manila
Repayment - Wells Fargo Bk Intl NYC
Ac Wells Fargo Asia Ltd Sgp No 003-023645
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 695 F.Supp. 1450, 1452 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter
Wells Fargo III].
20. The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), operated in New York City
by the New York Clearing House Association, handles more than ninety percent of all interna-
tional interbank dollar deposits. Foorman & James, Balanced Banks Have a CHIP on Both
Shoulders, INT'L FIN. L. REV. at 26-27 (July 1987) [hereinafter CHIP].
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tirety of the written communications between the banks. The Terms
and Conditions statement is important, for it stated:
The bank shall have no responsibility for or liability to the under-
signed for . . . the unavailability of such funds due to restrictions on
convertibility, requisitions, involuntary transfers, distraints of any char-
acter ... or other similar causes beyond the bank's control.
24
Through this document, Citibank attempted to transfer some of the
risks of carrying the deposit, such as natural catastrophes or bank rob-
beries, to WFAL.
Before the date of maturity arrived, a tragic event "beyond the
bank's control" occurred. Gunmen assassinated Philippine opposition
leader Benigno Aquino at Manila's international airport in August
1983. During the chaotic aftermath, investors withdrew millions of
dollars in Filipino capital from the country. 25 To avert a banking cri-
sis, on October 15, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued a
"Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks" ("MAAB") which for-
bade payment of the principal of certain foreign currency obligations
without the Central Bank's prior approval. The decree read in full:
Any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment of principal on all
foreign obligations due to foreign banks and/or financial institutions, ir-
respective of maturity, shall be submitted to the Central Bank thru the
Management of External Debt and Investment Accounts Department
(MEDIAD) for prior approval.
Accordingly, total obligations to foreign banks/financial institutions
as of the end of business hours in New York City on October 14, 1983,
shall not be reduced without prior Central Bank approval.
These measures shall apply to payments value dated during the pe-
riod October 17, 1983 to January 16, 1984.
Appropriate sanctions shall be imposed on banks which fail to
strictly comply with this directive. 26
According to Citibank, the MAAB had effectively frozen its Ma-
nila branch deposits. 27 Citibank/Manila made no written demands
seeking approval of payment prior to the maturity date of the WFAL
deposits. 28 Citibank/Manila did not pay WFAL's deposits when they
24. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 354.
25. Debt Management - Winning Back Confidence, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986, at 28 (Supple-
ment) (survey sponsored by Philippine Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of the Philip-
pines) (available on NEXIS) ("[T]he assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr. at Manila International
Airport demolished confidence in the Marcos government and accelerated capital flight. Within
weeks, the country literally ran out of foreign exchange.").
26. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 355. Eventually, the Philippines negotiated a "rescue
package" with the International Monetary Fund and other creditors. See Debt Management -
Winning Back Confidence, supra note 25.
27. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 355.
28. Id.
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matured in early December; in response, on February 10, 1984,
WFAL commenced litigation in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.29 On February 20, 1984, Citibank
applied to the Central Bank for permission to pay certain deposits.
The Central Bank granted the request on March 23, 1984, but only to
the extent of repayment with Citibank/Manila's non-Philippine assets:
i.e., branch assets not carried in its Philippine accounts. 30 Citibank
paid this amount, $934,000 (forty-six percent of the amount due), to
WFAL, but WFAL continued its action against Citibank.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The ensuing litigation proceeded sluggishly. Both parties at-
tempted to show that Eurodollar practices and custom supported their
positions. WFAL sought repayment by Citibank/Manila from parent
Citibank N.A.'s assets in New York. First, WFAL contended that the
the Terms and Conditions did not contemplate that WFAL would as-
sume the "sovereign risk," or the risk that action by the Philippine
government would prevent repayment of the debt. 31 Hence, Citibank
assumed the risk that the Philippines would place currency restric-
tions on its Manila branch.32. Second, WFAL argued that the deposits
were payable in New York and thus had their situs in New York.
This would preclude Citibank from asserting the Act of State doctrine
as an affirmative defense.
33
Citibank countered that the Central Bank's actions were part of
the sovereign risk, or "causes beyond the bank's control," assumed by
WFAL under the Terms and Conditions. 34 The differential in interest
rates between domestic deposits and Eurodollar deposits reflected that
assumption of sovereign risk; according to Citibank, every Eurodollar
depositor understood that greater risk accompanied the higher
yields.35 Citibank also contended that the Act of State doctrine pre-
cluded judicial review of the MAAB, as it was a foreign governmental
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 352. Both parties agreed that under the Terms and Conditions, Citibank/New
York would be liable for acts of a third person (such as a bank robber) or for acts of nature. Id.
at 352-53.
32. Id. at 352.
33. Id. at 356-57.
34. Citibank contended that since Eurodollar deposits did not need to be backed by reserves
because of the U.S. government's refusal to apply such restrictions to such deposits, Eurodollar
depositors understood that their deposits were governed by the local law of the foreign branch
and thus subject to sovereign risk. Id. at 356.
35. Id.
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action beyond the scope of American courts. 36 Judge Whitman
Knapp found that the issues deserved a full trial and rejected WFAL's
motion for summary judgment.
37
In December 1986, Judge Knapp tried the case without a jury.
38
Citibank still maintained that the debt was situated in Manila and gov-
erned by Philippine law. 39 Also, Citibank continued to contend that
the higher interest rates reflected the sovereign risk assumed by
WFAL. 4° But the court rejected this reasoning and accepted WFAL's
counterargument, acknowledging that the higher rate of interest ap-
plied to all of Citibank's foreign branches uniformly, regardless of
their locations. Hence, branches located in "unstable" nations gave
the same interest rates for Eurodollar deposits as did those located in
"stable" nations. 41
The trial court's central reasoning is notable. According to Judge
Knapp's memorandum opinion, WFAL, in addition to asserting that
parent Citibank, N.A., had "accepted the risk" of liability by Ci-
tibank/Manila, "now contends that it must prevail even if we assume
that the Deposits are payable only in Manila and are governed by Phil-
ippine law."'42 The court then applied Philippine law, which it found
to allow recovery by WFAL against all of Citibank/Manila's deposits,
whether carried in local (Filipino) or nonlocal (New York) accounts.
4 3
First, the court found that the Central Bank had deemed such use of
non-Filipino assets beyond its control; hence the MAAB did not affect
payment to WFAL from Citibank's global assets.44 To support that
proposition, WFAL had introduced a telex from the Central Bank
stating that it disavowed any objection to any judgment of a non-Phil-
ippine court that would use Citibank's non-Philippine assets to fulfill
its obligation to WFAL.45 Then, since Philippine law considered an
36. Id.
37. Id. at 358.
38. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F.Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) [hereinafter
Wells Fargo II].
39. Id. at 947.
40. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 356.
41. Wells Fargo II, supra note 38, at 950.
42. Id. at 947.
43. Id. at 948-50.
44. The court relied on testimony from WFAL's expert witness on Philippine law. Id. It
concluded that the purpose of the MAAB was to restrict capital flow from the Philippines. Pay-
ment from accounts outside of the Philippines would not offend the government. Id.
45. The Philippine Central Bank's telex message read in part:
If there is a judgment by a court or an extrajudicial settlement to the effect that a foreign
curency [sic] deposit placed with a foreign currency deposit unit ('FCDU') of the Philippine
branch of a foreign bank is recoverable from a non Philippine office of such foreign bank and
if such liability is satisfied from assets held outside the Philippines and does not result,
1046 [Vol. 11:1039
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obligation of a branch to be an obligation of the whole, the court held
Citibank, N.A., liable to WFAL for the deposit.
46
On March 25, 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit remanded the opinion to the district court 4 7 asking the
trial court whether its trial judgment was based primarily upon the
conclusion that WFAL and Citibank/Manila had agreed that the de-
posits were collectible only in Manila or upon the conclusion that
Philippine law governed the case.48 On remand, the trial court replied
that it had considered Philippine law to be "potentially" applicable
only after WFAL had stated it would prevail, even if the situs of the
debt were Manila and Filipino law governed.49 The trial court had
made such an examination of Philippine law based on the evidence
previously submitted (two affidavits by Philippine lawyers) by the par-
ties.5 0 However, upon its appeal to the Second Circuit, Citibank
presented "a wealth of material on Philippine law which it had never
brought to" the trial court's attention." The district court stated that
it had never "decided" that Philippine law applied to the case, but that
it only "assumed" that Philippine law governed the case.5 2
Continuing its response, the trial court interpreted the concept of
collectibility to be distinct from that of repayment; therefore, it bifur-
cated its analysis.5 3 Looking to the place of repayment, the court ex-
directly or indirectly, in a net outflow of foreign currency from the Philippines the Central
Bank of the Philippines is of the view that the satisfaction of payment of such deposit liabil-
ity would not be inconsistent with [the Decree].
Id. at 949-50.
46. Id. The court also found that no relevant custom or practice in international banking
was established by either party. Id. at 950. Citibank attempted to show that since Eurodollar
deposits were exempted from reserve requirements, the banking community worked on the prem-
ise that such deposits were payable only at the branch where made. The court found that ques-
tion, as well as Citibank's impossibility defense, moot. Id. The Act of State doctrine was also
not applicable, since Philippine law was not offended by payment from non-Philippine accounts.
Id.
47. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1988).
48. In the trial court's language, the Court of Appeals had remanded the case, "finding it
unclear whether [the trial court's] opinion disposing of this case had found that the parties had
agreed that the deposits were collectible only at Citibank's Manila branch or whether [it] had
held that Philippine law governed this action." Wells Fargo III, supra note 19, at 1450-51.
49. Id. at 1451.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1451 n.2.
53. In the court's language:
[R]epayment and collection describe two distinct concepts. Repayment refers to the
location where the wire transfers effectuating repayment at maturity were to occur. Collec-
tion refers to the place or places where plaintiff was entitled to look for satisfaction of its
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amined the telex agreements; based on the references to New York, it
found that the parties had agreed that the deposit would be repayable
in New York.54 The court then turned to the question of where the
deposit would be collectible. However, the court found nothing in the
telexes nor in Eurodollar practices and custom to be conclusive on
that issue.5" The court then applied both federal and New York
choice of law rules to find that New York law should apply.5 6 The
court felt that comprehensive application of New York banking law to
the Eurodollar market would give that system more uniformity. 57
Crucial to the district court's choice of New York law were the facts
that the deposits were made in U.S. dollars via New York correspon-
dent banks, and that Citibank was a New York-based bank.58 The
trial court concluded that all of Citibank's global assets could be
reached by WFAL under New York law,5 9 rejecting Citibank's de-
fense of impossibility. 6°
On appeal from remand, the Second Circuit upheld the trial
court's opinion.6' The appellate court agreed With the lower court's
reasoning, based on the content of the telex messages, that Citibank/
Manila and WFAL had jointly decided that repayment would be in
New York. 62 The court deemed such an agreement to be valid under
both New York and Philippine law. 63 The court also presumed that
the absence of an agreement as to where the deposit would be collected
54. Id. at 1454.
55. Id.
56. Using New York choice of law rules, the court determined which jurisdiction had "the
greatest interest in the litigation," based on interests and contacts involved in the case. Id. at
1454. The court noted that similar considerations existed in federal choice of law rules. Id.
57. The district court noted:
Since Eurodollar transactions denominated in U.S. dollars customarily are cleared in
New York, the rationale for application of New York law becomes even stronger. If the
goal is to promote certainty in international financial markets, it makes sense to apply New
York law uniformly, rather than conditioning the deposit obligations on the vagaries of local
law, and requiring each player in the Eurodollar market to investigate the law of numerous
foreign countries in order to ascertain which would limit repayment of deposits to the for-
eign branch's own assets.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Perez v. Chase Manhattan Nat'l Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 468, 463 N.E.2d
5, 7, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). The court did state that New
York courts would defer to Philippine law if the case involved either expropriation or taxation of
WFAL's deposit. Id. at 1454-55.
60. Since Citibank could still use non-Philippine assets to repay WFAL, it was not impossi-
ble for Citibank to fulfill its obligations. Id. at 1455.
61. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, at 660.
62. Id. at 660-61.
63. See CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES art. 1159 (1980) ("Obligations arising from con-
tracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith.").
Note, Wells Fargo v. Citibank
meant that it would be collectible in New York.64 Since the "agree-
ment" governed the choice of law, the situs of the debt was not Ma-
nila; in any event, the MAAB did not affect Citibank's ability to repay
WFAL.65
Citibank petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certio-
rari.66 On April 17, 1989, the High Court asked the Justice Depart-
ment for the federal government's views in both Wells Fargo and
another case involving both issues of foreign branch liability and an
appearance of Citibank as a defendant, Trinh v. Citibank NA. 67 The
Court granted certiorari to Wells Fargo on December 4, 1989.68
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW INVOLVED
A. Home Office Liability and the Separate Entity Doctrine
Under basic corporations law, courts will hold the home office lia-
ble for all of the obligations of its branch offices.69 The official referee
in Sokoloff v. National City Bank, one of the earliest foreign bank
branch liability cases, restated this principle:
[W]hen considered with relation to the parent bank, they [foreign
branches] are not independent agencies; they are, what their name im-
ports, merely branches, and are subject to the supervision and control of
the parent bank, and are instrumentalities whereby the parent bank car-
ries on its business, and are established for its own particular purposes,
and their business conduct and policies are controlled by the parent
bank, and their property and assets belong to the parent bank, although
nominally held in the names of the particular branches .... Ultimate
liability for a debt of a branch would rest upon the parent bank.
70
64. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, at 661 ("Since the court found here that there was no sepa-
rate agreement restricting where the deposits could be collected, and we are aware of nothing in
the record that contradicts that finding, we conclude that WFAL was entitled to collect the
deposits out of Citibank assets in New York"). One could contend that this conclusion resulted
from the appellate court's limited powers of review, as it was unable to make a different legal
conclusion without evidence suggesting otherwise.
65. Id.
66. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), petition for cert.
filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1989) (No. 88-1260).
67. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), briefs of the Solici-
tor General requested, 109 S. Ct. 1740 (Apr. 17, 1989) (No. 88-1260). See also Trinh v. Citibank,
N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Dec. 20,
1988) (No. 88-1031). For a discussion of Trinh, see infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
68. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110
S. Ct. 537 (Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 88-1260).
69. Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 LAW
& POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 903, 924-30 (1979).
70. 130 Misc. 66, 73, 224 N.Y.S. 102, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd mem., 223 A.D. 754, 227
N.Y.S. 907, aff'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (court
holding that bank's home office is ultimately liable for deposits placed in foreign branches upon
the wrongful failure of the foreign branch to repay the deposit on demand).
11049Spring 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
However, the "separate entity" doctrine, developed from the realities
of banking law, limits this to a great extent. Historically, banks did not
have the sophisticated communications facilities of today. Bowing to
the inability to verify financial information, the common law held that
a bank that accepts a deposit at one branch is not required to return
the deposit or to honor a check drawn upon it at another branch.
71
From this principle, courts have developed the theory that the bank
branch operates as a separate entity governed by the law of the
branch's locality. 72 Heininger, author of the seminal work on foreign
bank branch liability cases, summarized the modem concept of the
separate entity doctrine:
The separate entity doctrine makes clear that the home office of a
bank is not automatically held liable for obligations undertaken at its
foreign branches. Since a deposit placed in a foreign branch is generally
considered to be payable at the branch, it is not within the territorial
jurisdiction of a U.S. court (for purposes of garnishment or attachment).
Instead, the deposit is said to be situated in the jurisdiction where the
branch is located, and that country's laws or actions may affect the dis-
position of the deposit.73
Although a few courts have questioned the doctrine's viability in a
modern era of electronic communications, the separate entity doctrine
remains a part of American jurisprudence.
74
B. Act of State Doctrine
In United States courts, the theory that foreign branches exist as
separate entities governed by their local laws - and that the judicial
branch should give effect to such laws - is strengthened to some ex-,
tent by the Act of State doctrine. The relatively ancient doctrine re-
71. See Heininger, supra note 69, at 930 n. 107 and accompanying text.
72. See Heininger, supra note 69, at 930-35 (describing how the separate entity doctrine
evolved from the principle that deposits are payable only on demand at the branch where deposit
was originally made). The policy aspects of the doctrine were expressed in United States v. First
Nat'l City Bank:
Unless each branch of a bank is treated as a separate entity for attachment purposes, no
branch could safely pay a check drawn by its depositor without checking with all other
branches and the main offices.... This would place an intolerable burden upon banking and
commerce, particularly where the branches are numerous, as is often the case.
321 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1963) (quoting Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct.
1950), aff'd mem. 282 A.D. 940, 126 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1953)), rev'don other grounds, 379 U.S. 378
(1965).
See also Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 6 F.2d 762, 767
(2d Cir. 1925) ("the branch is not a mere 'teller's window'; it is a separate entity"), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 554. However, if a branch office closes voluntarily or wrongfully refuses a demand for
repayment, the home office is liable for the deposits of the branch office. See, e.g., Vishipco, supra
note 5; Sokoloff, supra note 70.
73. See Heininger, supra note 69, at 943.
74. For a summary discussion, see Heininger, supra note 69, at nn. 165-77 and accompanying
1050 [Vol. 11:1039
Note, Wells Fargo v. Citibank
flects the judicial branch's sentiments that "[e]very sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. '75 Based on
more elaborate reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, American courts should not judge the
merits of an "Act of State" - legal action by a foreign government -
if to do so would anger that government. 76 In cases involving the ac-
tions of a foreign state, judicial evaluation of the foreign state's action
might antagonize the foreign government and consequently frustrate
the U.S. executive branch's foreign policy goals. 77 Unsure of its com-
petency in international relations and the resulting implications for the
separation of powers, the Court has noted that its "engagement in the
task of passing on the validity of foreign [A]cts of [S]tate may hinder
rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and
for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere."
'7 8
Thus, under this federal common law principle, constitutional and for-
eign policy concerns could restrain judicial intervention in bank liabil-
ity cases resulting from foreign government actions.79 As applied to
foreign bank branch liability cases, the Act of State doctrine would
prevent a court from examining the merits of a foreign government's
expropriation of a bank branch: the court will have to presume that
the foreign state's act is legally justified.
8 0
75. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
76. 376 U.S. 398, 416-29 (1964). For a more detailed exploration of the doctrine, see gener-
ally, Foreign Branch Expropriation, supra note 9; Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in
Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967) (summarizing the legal mood at the time of
Sabbatino and criticizing legislative attempts to "repeal" the holding); Note, Rehabilitation and
Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 599 (1980) (criticizing
Sabbatino for confusing the Act of State doctrine).
For a dramatic proposed reform of the Act of State doctrine, see Knight, International Debt
and the Act of State Doctrine: Judicial Abstention Reconsidered, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
35 (1988) (contending that judicial abstention itself affects U.S. foreign policy and that courts
should aggressively seek the involvement of the executive branch in international debt cases).
77. The High Court stated:
The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may
hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals for itself and for the community of
nations as a whole in the international sphere.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
Some feel that the Court needlessly uses Sabbatino in many cases. See, e.g., Comment, Mak-
ing Cuba Pay: Satisfaction of Nationalization Claims Against Cuba - First National City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comerico Exteriorde Cuba, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 515, 536-37 (1984) (indi-
rect use of Sabbatino was unjustified in the case and led to cursory analysis of nationalization at
issue).
78. Sabbatino, 375 U.S. at 423.
79. Id. at 423-24 (stating that the Constitution was not directly involved, but that " 'constitu-
tional' underpinnings" were implicated by separation of powers issues).
80. For an example of judicial analysis of foreign government expropriation, see infra notes
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Through the years, the judicial and legislative branches have at-
tempted to develop exceptions to the Act of State doctrine. Keying on
language in Sabbatino and subsequent Supreme Court cases, some ju-
dicial exceptions have been advocated, including the Bernstein let-
ters,8 ' the treaty exception 2 and the commercial activities exception. 3
However, since the Supreme Court has either implicitly or explicitly
rejected these exceptions, they have fallen into disuse among the
courts.8 4 Congressional attempts to limit use of the Act of State doc-
155-62 and accompanying text (analyzing Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir.
1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1988) (No. 88-1031)).
81. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). In Bernstein, a Jewish German sued Dutch entities holding property
seized by Nazi Germany during World War II. Id. During litigation, the U.S. State Department
sent a letter to plaintiff's counsel stating that the Act of State doctrine was not implicated in
cases involving Nazi expropriations. That letter is reproduced in full at 20 DEP'T STATE BULL.
592-93 (1949).
Thus, if the executive branch, acting through the State Department, concludes that judicial
consideration of the foreign government's action would not hinder its foreign policy goals and
informs the court thereof, the court is free from the Act of State restrictions. Bernstein, 210 F.2d
at 376.
82. If the challenged actions of a foreign government are covered in a treaty between the
United States and the foreign state, the court should not apply the Act of State doctrine. See
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. For an application of the treaty exception, see Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir.
1984) (court cited the 1953 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Ethiopia as justifica-
tion for not applying the Act of State doctrine); Note, A Treaty Exception to the Act of State
Doctrine: A Framework for Judicial Application, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 201 (1986) (summarizing
Kalamazoo Spice and concluding that courts are competent to apply the treaty exception).
83. If the foreign government is acting within its sovereign capacity, its actions must be
recognized as valid. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704-06 (1976).
However, if the foreign state is acting in a proprietary capacity, the court does not have to defer
to the foreign government, and the Act of State doctrine is not applicable. Id. at 704, 707. For
more on Dunhill, see generally Comment, Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba: Interna-
tional Law Redivivus, 10 INT'L LAW. 471, 471 (1976) (stating that, but for one more step of logic,
the Court could have overturned Sabbatino); Friedman & Blau, Formulating a Commercial Ex-
ception to the Act of State Doctrine.- Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Republic of Cuba, 50 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 666 (1976) (article written by counsel to Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., sup-
porting an expanded commercial activities exception).
84. The Bernstein exception was not fully accepted in Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 696-711
(despite a letter from the State Department's Legal Adviser stating that judicial examination of
the legality of any Cuban act involved would not adversely affect the executive branch's overall
foreign policy goals, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Act of State doctrine for other
reasons). See also Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 369-70
n.274 (1986) (noting the reluctance of the State Department to issue Bernstein letters; the depart-
ment receives two to three requests for such letters annually, but as of 1986, it has issued only
seven Bernstein letters).
Courts have not favored the treaty exception, either. See, e.g., International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d
1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the treaty exception to the Act of State doctrine, court ruled
that the Act of State doctrine precluded plaintiff's claim that defendant engaged in fixing of oil
prices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
Very few courts have actually applied the commercial activities exception. See Leacock, The
Commercial Activity Exception to the Act of State Doctrine Revisited. Evolution of a Concept, 13
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 18 (1988) (explaining that since the commercial activities excep-
tion was raised by only a plurality of the Supreme Court, lower federal courts are not required to
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trine have included the Hickenlooper Amendment, which precludes
U.S. courts from using the Act of State doctrine to refrain from judg-
ing the merits of a case involving a claim of title or other property
rights taken in violation of international law. 85 However, the courts
have similarly cut back on these legislative attempts to rein in the doc-
trine by narrowly interpreting the statutes. 86 For example, one court
concluded that the Hickenlooper Amendment applied strictly to prop-
erty rights and not to contractual rights (such as a bank deposit).
87
In reality, the Act of State doctrine itself is limited only by the
extent to which U.S. courts prefer to exercise judicial restraint. An
attempt by a foreign government to act beyond its boundaries, in vio-
lation of U.S. law, will not be upheld by a U.S. court.88 For example,
address the issue). The Supreme Court itself did not fully accept the commercial activities excep-
tion. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring) (declining to accept the commercial
activity exception); Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that in cases involving political acts, the
courts should abstain from intervening for foreign policy reasons); Id. at 716-37 (Marshall, Bren-
nan, Stewart & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (rejecting the commercial activities exception).
Members of the High Court have contended that these broad exceptions to the Act of State
doctrine contradict the case-by-case approach adopted by the Court in Sabbatino. Dunhill, 425
U.S. at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The exceptions also confuse the legal picture. Note, An
Approach to Acts of State, Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamburn
& Co., 7 N.C.J. INT'L L. AND COM. REG. 409, 409 (1982) ("various 'exceptions' [have] led to
considerable uncertainty in the courts as to the parameters of the [A]ct of [S]tate doctrine").
85. Sabbatino was widely criticized. Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default: The
Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in International Business Transactions, 19
INT'L LAW. 225, 228 (1985). In the aftermath of Sabbatino, Congress attempted to force the
Court to retreat from the Sabbatino holding with the "Hickenlooper Amendment," Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)) [hereinafter Hickenlooper Amendment].
86. The judicial branch has narrowly interpreted the Hickenlooper Amendment, greatly re-
ducing its applicability. See Comment, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L.
103, 114 n.61 (1983) (noting that several banking and insurance interests had insisted on the
inclusion of several provisions narrowing the scope of the amendment before its passage, perhaps
allowing courts to justify their narrow interpretation of the amendment); Note, The Harvest of
Sabbatino: Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 87, 97
(1982) [hereinafter Harvest of Sabbatino] (noting that some courts have applied the amendment
only when the expropriated property is brought into this country).
87. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 57, 242 N.E.2d 704, 710, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433, 441-42 (1968).
88. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 1027 (1966). In a case involving trademarks owned by a Hungarian company, Zwack v.
Kraus Bros. & Co., the court noted that:
It is clear that the Hungarian government could not directly seize the assets which have
a situs in the state of the forum [the U.S.]. To allow it to do so indirectly through confisca-
tion of firm ownership would be to give its [expropriation] decree extraterritorial effect and
thereby emasculate the public policy of the forum against confiscation. This we decline to
do.
237 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1956). See also Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660
F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that debts in question were situated outside of Vietnam
at the time of uncompensated Vietnamese expropriation; thus, the Act of State doctrine was not
applicable), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
Judicial analysis of a foreign state's actions outside the state's territory will not offend the
state's territorial sovereignty. Recent Decision, Act of State - Foreign Expropriation Decrees -
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U.S. law and policy does not condone expropriation of property with-
out prompt, adequate, and effective compensation 9 Hence, the court
would be free to rule on the validity of such an action. 90 A similar
situation exists with respect to sovereign actions of a foreign govern-
ment unrecognized by the United States government when these acts
violate U.S. or international law.91 Because of such rationales, courts
will not apply the Act of State doctrine in situations where the object
of the foreign government's actions exists beyond the foreign state's
boundaries. Thus, the situs of the object - its legal "location" at the
time of action - becomes very important.
C. Situs Determination
With an obligation as intangible as a debt, the situs of the disputed
intangible obligation often looms as a determinative, if not the most
crucial, factor. 92 Unless the situs of a debt is already stipulated by
previous agreement 93 (as the lower courts in Wells Fargo have ruled),
the court will rely upon one of three situs tests: the domicile test, the
complete fruition test, or the incidents of the debt test. The choice of
test depends on the particular court involved, a factor which encour-
Act of State Doctrine Does Not Enable Foreign Sovereign to Confiscate Debts with Situs in the
United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 567, 573 (1977) (noting that this principle predates Sabbatino).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 712 (1986) (summarizing the principles and policy considerations supporting the U.S.
position).
90. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1981)
(citing Heininger, supra note 69, at 975), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
91. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F.Supp. 892, 909 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) ("A foreign state for such purposes [of the Act of State doctrine] is an entity recognized by
our Government, which has a defined territory and population under control of its govern-
ment."), modified, 433 F.2d 686, 708 (2d Cir. 1970) (with respect to damages), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 905 (1971). See also Heininger, supra note 69, at 979-86. U.S. courts have applied the Act
of State doctrine to acts of an unrecognized government when the political branches of the
United States consider that government to be the de jure government of that state. Sokoloff v.
Nat'l City Bank, 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd mem., 223 A.D. 754, 227
N.Y.S. 907, aff'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 81, 145 N.E. 917, 918-19 (1928). U.S. courts also have found
that although the political branches have refused to recognize a government as the de jure gov-
ernment of a foreign state, that government may nevertheless have a defacto existence recogniza-
ble for judicial purposes. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 227, 186 N.E.
679, 682 (1933) ("To refuse to recognize that Soviet Russia is a government regulating the inter-
nal affairs of the country is to give to fictions an air of reality which they do not deserve.").
92. See Note, Act of State: The Fundamental Inquiry of Situs Determination for Expropriated
Intangible Property. Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., II N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 121, 124-25
(1986) (noting that situs determination is crucial to determining the applicability of the Act of
State doctrine) [hereinafter Fundamental Inquiry].
93. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, at 660; Wells Fargo III, supra note 19, at 1451. See, e.g.,
Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd &
remanded on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (situs of debt was New York, as the deposit agree-
ment stipulated New York as location for repayment), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
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ages forum shopping. 94 The High Court could end this practice with a
definitive ruling in Wells Fargo.
95
Federal courts use the following three tests:
1. Domicile Test
The domicile test dates back to Harris v. Balk, a 1905 Supreme
Court debtor-creditor case.96 Under traditional jurisdiction principles,
the power of a state court to extend personal service on a debtor re-
quired that the debtor be physically within the territorial limits of that
state.97  Based on that reasoning, the Harris court concluded that
when a debtor is present within a state, that state has jurisdiction over
it.98 Therefore, the situs of the debt moves with a transient debtor, as
the debtor travels from state to state. 99 Application of the domicile
test in a bank liability case means that the situs of the debt is that of
the foreign branch if the branch has been expropriated and was operat-
ing at the time of expropriation. 00 Since the debt would be located in
the foreign country when the government expropriated or regulated
the debt, the Act of State doctrine would restrict a court from judging
that government's action. If the foreign branch has ceased operation,
however, the situs would no longer be the foreign country. Rather,
the object in question would "bounce" back to the home office in the
United States; the Act of State doctrine would not apply since the gov-
ernment action would not affect the debt. 10 1
94. The circuits are split as to which test is appropriate. Compare Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,
764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (court applied the incidents of the debt test in case involving
Mexican exchange control regulations) with Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.
1985) (court applied the complete fruition test in situation similar to Callejo). But even within
circuits, disagreement exists. Compare Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir.
1986) (incidents of debt test not used), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1575 (1987) with Callejo, 764 F.2d
1101 (incidents of debt test applied); compare Braka, 762 F.2d 222 (complete fruition test used)
with Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981) (domicile test
applied) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
95. Dilworth, Effect of Expropriation and Exchange Controls on U.S. Banks' Home Office
Liability For Foreign Branch Obligations - Act of State - Situs of Intangible Property, 83 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 573, 579-80 (1989) (commentator noting that the highly fact-specific approaches in-
volved in Wells Fargo, supra note 12, and Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988),
petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1988), give little guidance to the bar).
96. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
97. Id. at 221. See also E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 235-36 (1984) (summariz-
ing Harris).
98. Harris, 198 U.S. at 222-23.
99. Id. at 222.
100. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 474-77, 463 N.E.2d 5, 10-
11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695-97 (holding that since defendant bank's Cuban branches were operat-
ing at the time of their expropriation, situs of plaintiff's deposits was Cuba), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 966 (1984).
101. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1981)
(court finding that since Chase Manhattan had terminated its operations in Saigon, it no longer
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The Second Circuit applied the domicile test in Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 102 Plaintiff, a South Vietnamese corpo-
ration, had purchased a certificate of deposit (CD) from Chase Man-
hattan's branch in Saigon. 10 3 Approximately one week before the fall
of Saigon, the bank closed the branch and evacuated its personnel
without warning its depositors.'4 The Vietnamese government confis-
cated the bank branch soon thereafter. 0 5 The court found that the
situs of the debt was no longer Vietnam because Chase Manhattan had
"abandoned" its Saigon branch before the expropriation. 10 6 There-
fore, the court concluded that the Vietnamese action did not affect the
bank's obligations to the plaintiff. Thus, Vishipco Line shows how the
domicile test mechanically depends on only one factual conclusion;
unfortunately, such reliance can lead a court to overlook other impor-
tant considerations in a foreign branch liability case. 0 7
2. Complete Fruition Test
Courts can alternatively use the complete fruition test, sometimes
described as a "common sense" test. t0 8 Under the test, the situs of
expropriated property depends on whether a U.S. court determines
that a taking came to "complete fruition within the dominion of the
[foreign] government."' 1 9 This test has two prongs. First, both the
had a presence in Vietnam nor was subject to Vietnam's jurisdiction; thus, situs of debt was not
Vietnam and Act of State doctrine was not applicable), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Harvest
of Sabbatino, supra note 86; Partial Suspension, supra note 4.
102. 660 F.2d 854. For a more detailed analysis of the case, see Partial Suspension, supra
note 4; Harvest of Sabbatino, supra note 86.
103. The deposit received 23.5 percent interest and was repayable in Vietnamese currency.
660 F.2d at 857.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Citing both Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), and Heininger, supra note 69, the court
stated: "Since Chase had abandoned its Saigon branch at the time of the Vietnamese decree, and
since it had no separate corporate identity in Vietnam which would remain in existence after its
departure, the Vietnamese decree could not have had any effect on its debt to the corporate
plaintiffs." Id. at 862.
107. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
108. Cf Comment, The Act of State Doctrine, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 243, 250-51 (1984)
(stating that common sense dictates that a U.S. court should not consider a foreign state's actions
that come to complete fruition within that state, because the court's opinion on afait accompli is
irrelevant). See also Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d
Cir. 1984), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (stating that an expropriating
state is unlikely to follow a U.S. judicial opinion contrary to its own actions, especially in afait
accompl), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
109. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521. For further exploration of the case, see generally Com-
ment, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago. Applying the Act of State
Doctrine to Actions Against Foreign Debtors, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 183, 184 (1987) (contend-
ing that a situs test in the case was irrelevant, and that courts should directly consider Act of
State concerns); Note, Allied's Flawed Application of the Act of State Doctrine.- Impropriety of the
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creditor and depositor must be present within the jurisdiction of the
expropriating government. 110 Second, the object or debt in dispute
must have its situs within the realm of the foreign state.11  When ap-
plying the complete fruition test to determine the situs of a debt,
courts focus on provisions of the deposit contract to see if the twin
prongs have been met.' 12 If both prongs are satisfied, the court will
deem the expropriating state to have jurisdiction over the debtor, and
the Act of State doctrine will prevent the court from further consider-
ation of the matter. 
113
The Second Circuit applied the complete fruition test in Braka v.
Bancomer, S.NC 114 Plaintiffs had purchased dollar- and peso- de-
nominated CDs from Bancomer, then a privately owned Mexican
bank.' 15 The CDs stated in their terms of deposit that Mexico was
both the place of deposit and the place of payment of principal and
interest.116 Before the CDs matured, the Mexican government nation-
alized all of Mexico's banks and imposed an official exchange rate set
at approximately one-half the market exchange rate. 17 The court fo-
cused on the terms of the CDs, emphasizing that they stipulated Mex-
ico as the place of repayment. 1 18 Thus, the CDs were subject to effects
of the Mexican government's actions; applying the complete fruition
test, the court found their situs to be Mexico. 19 In the court's judg-
ment, "to intervene to contradict the result of the [Mexican] exchange
controls would be an impermissible intrusion into the governmental
activities of a foreign sovereign."' 120 Braka illustrates how the com-
Doctrine in International Finance, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 253, 254 (1987) (stating that the court
adopted an "inaccurate formula of debt situs incompatible with the [Alct of [S]tate doctrine's
constitutional underpinnings").
110. See Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 713-16 (5th
Cir.) (holding, in part, that since defendant was a Florida-based corporation with no presence in
Cuba at the time of expropriation, Cuba was not able to perform afait accompli, thus precluding
use of Act of State doctrine), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968).
111. See Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521-22 (concluding that since situs of debt was in New
York at the time of the Costa Rican exchange regulations, the Costa Rican government was not
able to perform a fait accompli; hence, the Act of State doctrine was not applicable).
112. See Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1985) (court relying on
contractual provisions of certificates of deposits issued by the bank for situs determination).
113. In such a case, the party injured by an Act of State must seek relief from the political
branches. Comment, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States
Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 495 (1985).
114. 762 F.2d 222. For further exploration of the case, see Fundamental Inquiry, supra note
92.
115. Id. at 223.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 224.
119. Id. at 225.
120. Id.
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plete fruition test focuses on the terms of a deposit agreement. How-
ever, the complete fruition test's narrow factual approach may fail to
account for factors not embodied within the four corners of the
contract. 121
3. Incidents of the Debt Test
Frustration with the limitations of the complete fruition test and
its narrow focus on the terms of the deposit contract has led to the
Fifth Circuit's development of the incidents of the debt test in Callejo
v. Bancomer, S.A. 122 The test looks at "where the incidents of the
debt, as a whole, place it.'123 A court applying the test to determine if
the situs is the United States or a foreign state would consider a
number of factors, including where the deposit was carried, the place
of repayment, the subjective intent of the parties, and the extent of
involvement of the American regulatory agencies.' 24 One commenta-
tor adds that the currency denomination could be an additional inci-
dent to consider. 125 In this manner, the incidents of the debt test does
not restrict itself to the text of the deposit agreement. If after consid-
ering these factors, the court judges that the interests of the foreign
state outweigh those of the United States, then the situs of the debt
will be the foreign state and the Act of State doctrine will prevent the
court from ruling on the foreign state's action. ' 26 If not, then the situs
of the debt is the U.S., outside the foreign nation's territory; the court
will not apply the Act of State doctrine. Thus, the incidents of the
debt test allows the court to account fully for the interests of the for-
eign government and avoid antagonizing it. 127 It also gives the court
121. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
122. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally Note,
Callejo v. Bancomer, SA.: The Need for a Commercial Activity Exception to the Act of State
Doctrine, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 413 (1985) (the note does not discuss the incidents of the
debt test specifically, but describes how Callejo illustrates the need for a strong commercial activ-
ities exception to the Act of State doctrine).
123. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1123.
124. Id.
125. A sovereign country expects more control over its own currency and may also expect
more control over debts denominated in such currency. See Note, The Act of State Doctrine:
Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 613 (1986) [hereinafter Debt Situs
Confusion]. However, some countries, such as the United States and Japan, expect no such con-
trol over debts denominated in their currency, as demonstrated by the existence of the Eurodol-
lar and Euroyen markets. Id.
126. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1124-26 (court finding that Mexico's interests in the debt out-
weighed those of the U.S.; hence, a U.S. court's consideration of the merits of the Mexican
government's actions would antagonize Mexico).
127. One commentator has contended that the Fifth Circuit "abruptly abandoned the inci-
dents of the debt test" in Grass v. Credito Mexicano, 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1575 (1987). See Foreign Branch Expropriation, supra note 9, at 125 n.163. The
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enough flexibility to consider the myriad realities of the commercial
world.
128
Like Braka, Callejo also involved plaintiffs who purchased CDs
from Bancomer before the Mexican nationalization. 29 After the Mex-
ican currency regulations, Bancomer notified the Callejos that it
would repay them under the official exchange rate. The Callejos
claimed that the Act of State doctrine should not be used. They ar-
gued that situs of the CDs was Texas, since they had ordered their
Dallas bank to wire funds to a bank in Laredo, Texas, where
Bancomer's accounts would be credited. Hence, the Mexican regula-
tions would not apply. ' 30 The court rejected this argument. After for-
mulating the incidents of the debt test, the court concluded that these
incidents clearly placed the debt in Mexico: the CDs were issued by
Bancomer in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, and their terms called for pay-
ment in Mexico. 131
Cases like Vishipco, Braka, and Callejo show that in a variety of
contexts, U.S. courts have applied different situs determination tests.
The conflicting uses of the tests among and within the circuits have
confused the banking industry. Many of these cases seem to rely on
highly fact-specific analyses - such as whether the branch was opera-
tional or what the deposit contract said - treating situs determination
as a factual question. 132  Determining where a tangible object has its
situs does involve a question of fact. 133 As the courts originally devel-
oped the domicile and complete fruition tests in cases involving tangi-
ble property, perhaps the fact-specific approach was necessary.13
4
appellate court did not go through situs determination at all. Grass, 797 F.2d at 221. This
would reflect the conflict within the Fifth Circuit as to the proper test.
However, elements of the incidents of the debt test are still used. See Edelmann v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 856 F.2d 322, amended, 861 F.2d. 1291 (1st Cir. 1988). In Edelmann,
Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation, applied a conflict of laws test resem-
bling the incidents of the debt test and found that New York law should govern the debt in issue.
861 F.2d at 1301-02. In addition, the Second Circuit in Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d
222 (2d Cir. 1985), seemed to leave room for a more flexible test that would analyze extrinsic
factors as well as contractual ones. See Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 92, at 128 ("The court
seems to reserve application of a situs test that considers policy considerations and factors extrin-
sic to the credit instrument for facts that might motivate the court to look beyond the parties'
contract.").
128. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
129. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 1121. The court also rejected the plaintiff's attempts to invoke the commercial
activity and treaty exceptions. Id. at 1114-21.
131. Id. at 1123-24.
132. The situs of tangible property is a factual question. American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909) (the Court noting that "sovereignty is pure fact" in a case
involving title to lands seized after secession of Panama from Colombia in 1905).
133. Id. See also Dilworth, supra note 95, at 579 n.30.
134. See Debt Situs Confusion, supra note 125, at 601.
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However, the situs of intangible property or of contractual rights (like
a deposit) presents a legal question, calling for thorough judicial analy-
sis of the legal relationships involved in the case.1 35
The Court should adapt the Act of State doctrine properly to bank
liability cases by moving away from fact-specific situs tests that may
distort common understandings in the commercial banking industry.
The judicial branch should formulate a single situs determination test
applied as a question of law, instead of using all three -tests, some of
which depend on questions of fact and thereby give the trial court
more discretion over the end result. A single situs test that would
allow for broader consideration of multiple factors and that would al-
low for greater oversight by higher courts would benefit the banking
industry.
V. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE LOWER COURTS' DECISIONS
However, neither the domicile, the complete fruition, nor the inci-
dents of the debt tests were applied in Wells Fargo, Instead, the trial
court on remand found that the telexes constituted a deposit agree-
ment with repayment to be made in New York, eliminating the need
to use situs tests.136 By interpreting fragments from telex messages to
be a binding legal document, the lower court avoided making a choice
among the situs tests.1 37 The High Court's adoption of this reasoning
would lead to a simple, yet unacceptable result. That should not
occur.
In rejecting the lower court's reasoning for situs determination, the
Supreme Court should take advantage of the opportunity to end the
conflict among the circuits as to the appropriate situs determination
test. Adoption of the incidents of the debt test would allow the judi-
cial branch to account for the concerns raised by the Act of State doc-
trine, while also enabling courts to consider the realities of the
commercial banking world, instead of narrowly focusing on a few
facts. Although continued use of the fact-dependent domicile and
complete fruition tests would allow the courts a greater degree of flexi-
bility in exercising their discretion in bank liability cases, the resulting
confusion would seriously disrupt the banking industry, which prizes
135. See Dilworth, supra note 95, at 579 n.30 and accompanying text.
136. Wells Fargo III, supra note 16, at 1452-53.
137. Such dependence on the exact terms of the telex messages seems misplaced. Foreign
exchange transactions are normally arranged by word of mouth over the telephone, unless telexes
are used. T. MCRAE & D. WALKER, FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT 35 (1980). Thus,
many aspects of Eurodollar transactions are never recorded.
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stability in its operations.1 38
A. Legal Burdens of Wells Fargo
The trial court did not fully appreciate these concerns when it
based its judgment on the fragmented telex messages. To interpret the
telexes as the trial court did would stretch both textual and financial
logic. The telexes merely represent confirmations of oral contracts
made between the two parties which incorporate implied condi-
tions. 1 39 As stated earlier, Eurodollar actors have always presumed
that the situs of repayment - governed by the local law - would be
in the overseas branch, not the home office.' 4° Wells Fargo would
place the situs at the home office, drastically undermining part of the
Eurodollar system's legal foundation.' 41
The court in Callejo avoided such a result by rejecting the plain-
tiff's contention that the correspondent bank's location dictated where
the situs of a debt should be.' 42 A correspondent bank is merely a
"conduit" for deposits, not their repository, reasoned the court. 43 As
it noted:
To hold otherwise would throw a monkeywrench into the wheels of in-
ternational finance, whose smooth operation depends in large part on the
lubricating influence of correspondent banks. It would mean that the
138. See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 18.
140. The original Eurodollar customers, Eastern Bloc countries, placed their dollar reserves
outside the United States to avoid the reach of U.S. banking regulations. Thus, immediate legal
liability for such deposits was to fall outside of the United States. H. RIEHL & R. RODRIGUEZ,
FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND MONEY MARKET EXCHANGES 9 (1983). Also, the additional interest
that Eurodollar depositors receive reflects the risk that they assume by collecting their debts in
the foreign country, rather than in the United States: "For example, a U.S. dollar deposit with
the Swiss branch of an American bank and a deposit with another branch of the same bank in a
less stable country command different rates because of the difference in sovereign risk." Id.
Citibank made this a major point in its argument. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 356. How-
ever, in this case interest rates among all foreign countries were uniform, albeit higher than in the
United States. Id.
141. The United States filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Citibank, stating: "We believe
that Citibank is correct in asserting that the court of appeals misconstrued the parties' deposit
agreements. Moreover, that mistake - though seemingly narrow and factbound - could have
serious consequences for the international banking community." Supreme Court to Review Ci-
tibank's Liability for Foreign Branch Deposits, Daily Report for Executives, (BNA) (December 5,
1989) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank,
N.A., 852 F.2d 657, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 537 (Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 88-1260)).
142. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 129-31 and
accompanying text.
143. Id. at 1125. The court in Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985)
rejected similar arguments; plaintiffs had contended that since they had made some purchases
from defendant bank by sending checks to its New York agency and received some interest
payments in New York, New York was the situs of the debt. Id. at 224. Instead, the court found
that the situs was Mexico because the Mexican government's currency restrictions came to com-
plete fruition in Mexico. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
1Michigan Journal of International Law
deposits held by a bank would have different situses depending on the lo-
cations of the corresponding banks that first received them. Potentially a
bank would have to comply with different laws for different deposits at a
single branch. Rather than open this Pandora's box, banks would almost
certainly attempt to receive deposits directly, without the services of a
correspondent bank. 44
But unlike the Callejo court, the Wells Fargo court dared to open a
Pandora's box of legal complications for the U.S. banking industry
when it found the location of the correspondent bank to be determina-
tive. Wells Fargo's reasoning would dictate that deposits linked to dif-
ferent correspondent banks would have different situs locations,
creating a confusing situation for banks. Finally, while forcing
branches into the legal dilemma described above, the court's decision
would also subject all Eurodollar transactions with a "base" in New
York to its interpretation of New York law. 145
Undoubtedly, over time, U.S. banks could redraft Eurodollar
transactions to circumvent the legal effect of the Wells Fargo decision.
For example, banking lawyers could add governing-law clauses to the
standard Eurodollar transaction forms. The choice of law would then
be mandated by contract. Yet some courts might not allow Eurodol-
lar actors to shift risks by contract. 46 The resulting legal tangles
would mean that Eurodollar depositors with U.S. banks would never
be certain as to the legal risks that their deposits entailed.
Alternatively, the banking industry could seek regulatory or legis-
lative help. The U.S. regulatory entities (the Federal Reserve Board
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC]) could inter-
vene. An attempt to work around Wells Fargo through U.S. federal
bank regulation, however, might not effectively end the potential legal
confusion as additional regulation would not reach deposits already
outstanding in the foreign branch offices and could possibly add to the
cost of transactions. 47 In addition, Congress has been very reluctant
144. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1125 (emphasis added). Such a result would lead to higher legal
and commercial costs. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text for more discussion of
Callejo.
145. See Wells Fargo III, supra note 19.
146. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., suggests that no contractual clause
could effectively limit the liability of the U.S. home office. 660 F.2d 854, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). Also, recall that Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., did not give full
effect to contractual provisions requiring repayment in Vietnamese currency and only in Saigon
or to a force majeure clause that could have relieved Citibank of liability. 850 F.2d 1164, 1168,
(6th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1988) (No. 88-1031). See
also infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text; Note, Recent Trends in Branch Expropriation
Cases, 8 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 45, 71 (1984) (stating that courts might find such clauses to
be unconscionable).
147. Some believe that excessive U.S. government regulation caused the U.S. markets to lose
the Eurodollar maket to London. Szala, Will U.S. Rules Drive Trading Overseas? FUTURES:
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to regulate the Eurodollar deposits, specifically exempting foreign
bank branches from reserve requirements 148 and excluding deposits at
foreign branches from the coverage of the FDIC.149 Since reserve re-
quirements are the principal manner of implementing monetary pol-
icy, one could infer that Congress does not deem deposits in foreign
bank branches to be vital to the implementation of U.S. monetary pol-
icy.150 Agencies acting against Congressional intent would do so at
their political peril.
In sum, the legal and regulatory uncertainty generated by Wells
Fargo places U.S. banks in a disadvantageous commercial position, as
subsequent Eurodollar transactions would reflect higher regulatory
and legal costs peculiar to deposits with United States-based banks.
Such transactional obstacles would hinder U.S. international banks in
an era of heightened competitiveness. The U.S. banking system faces
pressures in the Eurocurrency market as Japanese and German banks
increase their market presence. 151 The global financial system would
eventually shift in favor of Euroyen or Euromark transactions not fac-
ing the same restrictions that a Wells Fargo-burdened U.S. system
would. Thus, fears of government regulation in the Eurodollar market
abound in the banking industry, as one pessimistic observer noted in
an article concerning a proposed extension of FDIC insurance (and
premiums) to Eurodollar deposits:
If the new premium is to be assessed against Eurodollars, too, Ameri-
can banks can close down all their overseas branches, because there's no
way they'll ever be able to compete. Money center American banks
could probably consider closing down the headquarters operations, too,
because foreigners who can fund their U.S. loans out of uninsured dollar
deposits back home will have a colossal pricing advantage over the banks
of the host country. 1
52
If upheld, Wells Fargo could confirm these fears that our legal and
political systems serve as shackles to U.S. competitiveness in a global
market. Hopefully, the Court will understand these fears and strike
down the lower court's decision.
THE MAGAZINE OF COMMODITIES AND OPTIONS, Aug. 1988, at 35 ("Although the Fed has
relaxed some restrictions, the business isn't coming back.").
148. Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 103, 94 Stat. 132, 136 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(6) (1988)).
149. International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 97-110, § 102, 95
Stat. 1513 (1981) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(5)(A) (1988)).
150. See Note, Holding US. Bank Home Offices Liable for Deposits in Their Foreign
Branches, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 621, 632 (1988).
151. Before 1984, only 4.2 percent of world official foreign exchange reserves were denomi-
nated in Japanese yen. In May 1984, the U.S. and Japan concluded negotiations liberalizing
Japanese currency restrictions. See J. GRABBE supra note 16, at 55.
152. Mayer, Massacring the Innocents, Am. Banker, Feb. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
Spring 19901 1063
Michigan Journal of International Law
B. The Need for a Single Situs Determination Test
In striking down the lower court reasoning, the Court should also
address Act of State concerns. A High Court that limited itself to the
simple analysis of the lower jurisdictions would miss a great opportu-
nity to end the ongoing disagreement on the proper situs determina-
tion test for bank liability cases as well as to curb the resulting forum-
shopping.1 53 Although the tests appear to be similar, a court's discre-
tionary choice of a particular test is determinative of the result in each
case. 154 For example, in Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., which had been
paired by the High Court with Wells Fargo for comment by the Justice
Department, t55 use of the domicile test instead of the incidents of the
debt test led to vastly differing results.
Trinh, a Vietnamese citizen, placed a deposit with Citibank's Sai-
gon branch during the Vietnam conflict.t 56 The terms of the deposit
stipulated that Trinh would receive nineteen percent interest (as op-
posed to the five percent interest then required by U.S. law for domes-
tic U.S. deposits) and the debt would be repayable in South
Vietnamese currency only in Saigon.' 57 The district court applied the
domicile test, finding that since Citibank had "voluntarily" withdrawn
its personnel and closed its Saigon branch less than a week before the
North Vietnamese conquest of Saigon (and Citibank's branch office),
the situs of the debt had reverted to the home office in New York.1
58
This result, also illustrated by the earlier case of Vishipco Line,
presents U.S. banks with the Hobson's choice of either withdrawing
their personnel upon notice of imminent danger - and later being
held liable for a relocated debt - or maintaining the office under such
circumstances and possibly risking the personal safety of bank person-
nel. 59 If, on the other hand, the district court had applied the inci-
dents of the debt test, the facts of the case would seem to indicate that
the situs of the debt was Saigon, and not New York. 160 It would then
153. See Foreign Branch Expropriation, supra note 9.
154. See Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 92.
155. See supra note 67.
156. Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F.Supp. 1526 (E.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd, 850 F.2d 1164,
1166 (6th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1988) (No. 88-
1031).
157. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1166.
158. Trinh, 623 F.Supp. at 1533-34.
159. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhatton Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). See Foreign Branch Expropriation, supra note 9, at 118 (explaining
that use of domicile test presents U.S. banks with an awkward situation).
160. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1170-71. See also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123-25
(5th Cir. 1985) (explaining the analysis involved in the incidents of the debt test).
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follow that the Act of State doctrine would preclude judicial analysis
of the Vietnamese nationalization of Trinh's debt and relieve Citibank
of its obligations.1 61 As Trinh shows, the court's discretionary choice
as to which situs determination test applied, and not the specific facts
of Trinh, decided whether Trinh could collect from Citibank. Such
disparate results could be eliminated in Wells Fargo if the High Court,
after finding that the telexes did not constitute an agreement as to re-
payment, would also take up an analysis to see if the Act of State
doctrine should apply.1 62 If the Court takes this approach, then it
could also consider the situs determination issue. Only by this ap-
proach could the Supreme Court finally end the conflicts among and
within the circuits as to which situs determination test should be used.
Theoretically, the Court could resolve Wells Fargo without ad-
dressing Act of State concerns and hence avoid the chaos surrounding
situs determination. Recall that the Act of State doctrine was devel-
oped to avoid conflicts with foreign governments.1 63 However, in
Wells Fargo, the Philippine Central Bank sent a telex message to
WFAL disavowing any objection to the use of Citibank/Manila's non-
Filipino assets in a judgment for WFAL. 164 The Court could construe
that message as indicative of the Philippine government's consent to
the U.S. judicial branch's judgment of this case; hence, the Act of
State doctrine need not apply. Although this would allow the Court
to avoid the Act of State question, it would be a disturbing precedent.
First, the confusion over situs determination tests would remain. Sec-
ond, the Court has stated that the proper method for foreign govern-
ments to express their opinions in pending litigation is to file an
amicus curiae brief.165 Third, acceptance of the telex as the definitive
161. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 473, 463 N.E.2d 5, 11, 474
N.Y.S.2d 689, 695 (stating that application of Act of State doctrine requires court to accept
expropriation as a collection of the debt), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). For more on Perez,
see Note, Debt Situs and the Act of State Doctrine. A Proposal for a More Flexible Standard, 49
ALBANY L. REV. 647 (1985).
162. See Dilworth supra note 95, at 580.
163. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
165. During the litigation of Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978), the
European Economic Community (EEC) feared that a victory by Zenith would violate Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), threatening negotiations in the GATT
Tokyo Round. Both the EEC and Japan sent diplomatic notes expressing their views to the U.S.
State Department, and asked the Solicitor General to distribute them to the Court (they are
reproduced at 17 I.L.M. 934 (1978)). The Clerk of the Supreme Court did distribute the notes,
but later told the Solicitor General that the Court's rules did not contemplate future distributions
of such notes. The Clerk suggested that an amicus curiae brief was the proper method for a
foreign government to express its views on a pending case before the Supreme Court. See J.
JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 141 (2d
ed. 1986).
Spring 1990] 1065
Michigan Journal of International Law
opinion of the Philippine government would implicate various separa-
tion of powers concerns, which previous courts have attempted to
avoid via judicial deference to the political branches.166 Such action
would conjure a myriad of scenarios: rival governments issuing opin-
ions, multiple pronouncements by different entities of a foreign gov-
ernment, and delicate interpretation of obtuse communications. In
such situations, a court using foreign government "messages" to avoid
full analysis of the Act of State doctrine could cause the U.S. govern-
ment to speak with more than one voice in foreign affairs. 167 Fortu-
nately, the Court is reluctant to create new exceptions to the Act of
State doctrine. 68 Also, the Restatement states that "the doctrine can-
not be 'waived' by the foreign state" per se. ' 69 Thus, the Court should
reject this shortcut.
C. The Proper Situs Determination Test
If the Court were to decide to consider Act of State concerns, it
should adopt the best approach to the situs question - the incidents
of the debt test. 170 A U.S. court applying the test would be free to
consider a variety of factors, including those not specified in the writ-
ten deposit agreement. 17 1 The Court could fill in the many gaps in the
telexes with unwritten clauses arising from standard practices in the
Eurodollar trade. The Court could also consider statements like the
Central Bank's telex message as evidence of a foreign government's
interest in the litigation. 172 In addition, the application of the test, as a
question of law, would be more open to judicial review upon appeal,
166. As Professor L. Henkin has noted:
[F]oreign affairs make a difference. The courts are less willing than elsewhere to curb the
political branches and have even developed doctrines of special deference to them. They
have asserted judicial power to develop doctrines to safeguard the national interest in inter-
national relations against both judicial interference and invasion by the States.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 206-07 (1972) (footnote omitted).
167. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (mentioning the "potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question").
168. See supra note 84.
169. However, such statements should be considered by the court in determining whether the
Act of State doctrine should apply, as consent may weaken the justification for applying the
doctrine. But such consent does not completely eliminate the Act of State concerns. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, § 443, comment e
(1986).
170. See Dilworth, supra note 95, at 580; Debt Situs Confusion, supra note 125, at 611-17.
171. These incidents include where the debt was carried, the place of payment, intent of the
parties regarding choice of law, and involvement of the American banking regulatory system.
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1985).
172. This would be a proper use of the Central Bank's telex message, rather than as a means
to avoid analysis of the Act of State issues involved. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying
text. Also, the Restatement states that "indications of consent to adjudication by the courts of
another state are highly relevant." See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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thus allowing the sensitive field of international banking law to de-
velop under appellate court guidance.
Judicial consideration of the factors, or incidents, enumerated in
Callejo would seem to indicate that WFAL's deposit was situated in
Manila. 73 One factor is the place where the deposit is carried. Pay-
ments in the Eurodollar system are made through a clearinghouse sys-
tem, with the demand account based in Citibank/New York.
1 74
However, as one witness stated, no significance should be made of the
identity or location of the correspondent bank.175 The Callejo court
expressed similar sentiments. 176 In this case, the Court should not
consider the correspondent bank's location in New York to be
determinative.
Another factor to consider is the intent of the parties as to the law
governing the deposit.' 77  The trial court's findings aside, neither
party had stipulated whether Philippine or New York law should ap-
ply. 178 Evidence presented by Citibank and other sources suggest that
Eurodollar depositors understood that the deposit was made under
Philippine law, the law of the foreign branch. 79  Hence, no intent of
the parties beyond general commercial practices could be established.
173. The court derived these factors from previous bank liability cases: Dunn v. Bank of
Nova Scotia, 374 F.2d 876, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that place where deposit is held, if
not stipulated by contract, is the situs of the deposit); Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti
Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315, 324-25, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1199, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (1982)
(holding that when parties intend New York law to govern dispute resolution, the situs of the
debt is New York); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.
1984), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (holding that since defendant
bank's promissory notes provided for repayment in New York, New York was the situs of repay-
ment), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
174. CHIP, supra note 20.
175. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 354. See also Scanlon, Definitions and Mechanics of
Eurodollar Transactions, in THE EURODOLLAR 22 (H. Prochnow ed. 1970) ("The [Eurodollar]
market has no specific location. Its physical dimension is essentially a network of international
telecommunication media ... .
176. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
177. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985).
178. The court of appeals found that silence in the telexes on where the debt was collectible
indicated that WFAL could collect the debt from Citibank assets in New York. Wells Fargo,
supra note 12, at 661. But logically, such silence should equally indicate that WFAL could
collect the debt from Citibank/Manila assets. See supra note 64.
179. Wells Fargo I, supra note 16, at 356. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM.,
91ST CONG., 2D SESS., THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET AND ITS PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2
(Comm. Print 1970) (noting that investors seeking higher interest rates in the Eurodollar market
understand that they receive higher rates because the local country could impose currency re-
strictions on the deposit); Logan & Kantor, Deposits at Expropriated Foreign Branches of U.S.
Banks, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 335 (states expect foreign bank branches to accept their regula-
tions and laws; hence, customers of foreign bank branches must accept the risks involved with
such laws); Transnational Flow, supra note 18, at 499-500 ("Branches operating in a foreign
country are, of course, subject to local laws."); P. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1 ("The foreign
branch must comply with all the banking rules, exchange controls, and regulations of the host
country .... ); 35 Fed. Reg. 2768, supra note 15 ("A customer who makes a deposit that is
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Another issue to examine would be the place of payment.180
Whether the place of payment should be New York, as the trial court
held by finding that the parties had made an agreement, or whether it
should be Manila would depend on resolution of the other incidents.
This would be preferable to focusing on sentence fragments in a few
telex messages.
Finally, a court applying the incidents of the debt test would ex-
amine the extent of the U.S. regulatory system's involvement. 81 The
U.S. regulatory system does not appear to be heavily involved in the
Eurodollar system or in the deposits at issue. Eurodollar deposits by
nature are designed to avoid direct U.S. regulation.1 82 For example,
they carry higher rates of interest than domestic deposits.' 83 In addi-
tion, federal agency and Congressional actions have excluded foreign
bank branch deposits from their regulatory reach.1 84 Moreover, while
the deposits were denominated in U.S. dollars, that fact does not indi-
cate that the U.S. had strong sovereign interests in these Eurodollar
deposits. 185 In Wells Fargo III, the court hints that it thought other-
wise.186 This outcome of the incidents of the debt test, which would
suggest the situs to be Manila, is supported by history. Eurodollar
deposits were created for Eastern European countries with large
amounts of reserves in U.S. currency who faced the possibility of strict
anti-Communist currency restrictions imposed by the U.S. govern-
ment. Situating the deposits outside the U.S., with New York as a
mere transmission point, allowed these and other countries to get
around U.S. regulation. 87 Thus, the historical practice of Eurodollar
depositors seems to suggest that the deposit was carried in Manila.
The incidents of the debt test seems to resemble the traditional
conflict of laws approach used in domestic law, but the criticisms of
that approach do not apply to the incidents of the debt test. Granted,
the test has a superficial similarity to the center of gravity test com-
monly applied in contract cases. '88 That test requires the court to de-
payable solely at a foreign branch assumes whatever risk may exist that the foreign country
might impose restrictions on withdrawals.").
180. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985).
181. Id. at 1123-25.
182. Deposits in foreign branches are not subject to reserve requirements set by the Federal
Reserve Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See supra note 15.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
185. See Debt Situs Confusion, supra note 125, at 613.
186. Wells Fargo III, supra note 19, at 1454.
187. See H. RIEHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 140.
188. See Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F.Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (stating that Fed-
eral courts determine the center of gravity of a contract to resolve a conflict of laws question).
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termine which state has the most significant relationship to the subject
matter of the dispute. 189 In making this determination, the court
looks to the contacts between the subject matter and the states. 190 If
such a test were directly applied to bank liability cases, courts would
have more flexibility to consider factors in determining the situs.' 9
Courts would still be able to account for the expectations of the for-
eign state in its analysis; however, the center of gravity test would give
courts much discretion in bank liability cases. 192 Banks would also
face more uncertainty in bank liability litigation.' 93 Although the
center of gravity test allows for a loose (and uncertain) approach to
bank liability cases, the more refined incidents of the debt test focuses
more on specific factors involved in these cases.194 That test also re-
tains the prime objective of avoiding the antagonism of foreign govern-
ments. 195 In short, the incidents of the debt test appears to fit the
specific issues involved in cases such as Wells Fargo.
The Court could apply the other situs determination tests. How-
ever, these tests focus too much on narrow factual issues such as the
operational status of the branch or the terms of the deposit agreement.
Such "tunnel vision" would lead courts to overlook the interests of the
states involved and to reach artificial results.
The High Court could adopt the domicile test as the test for bank
liability cases and other situations involving intangible assets. Ci-
tibank/Manila had not ceased operation. Rather, the MAAB merely
restricted repayment of the debt with Philippine assets. 196 At least one
witness in the bench trial testified that WFAL might still be able to
reach non-Philippine assets of Citibank/Manila. 197 In any event, the
debt was neither expropriated nor extinguished by the Philippine Cen-
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6,188 (1969). See also E. SCOLES
AND P. HAY, supra note 97, at 656-70 (explaining that the center of gravity approach is more
flexible than the test embodied in the First Restatement).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
191. See Foreign Branch Expropriation, supra note 9, at 138-39.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
193. See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954) (stating that the
center of gravity test leads to less predictable results).
194. See Foreign Branch Expropriation, supra note 9, at 137 n.250 (stating that the incidents
of the debt test used in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), involves quanti-
tative evaluation of the contacts and factors involved, whereas the center of gravity test does
not).
195. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1123-24 ("[The incidents of the debt] help to answer the ultimate
question in the (A]ct of [S]tate context: Are the ties to the debt to the foreign country sufficiently
close that we will antagonize the foreign government by not recognizing its acts?").
196. Wells Fargo II, supra note 38, at 950.
197. Id. at 948-49.
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tral Bank. Therefore, use of the domicile test might lead the High
Court to decide that Manila was the situs of the debt.
Yet, adoption of the domicile test would force U.S. financial insti-
tutions into the Hobson's choice between liability and danger to per-
sonnel illustrated infra in Trinh.198 Americans abroad, facing dangers
from the threat of terrorism and other violence, do not need further
exposure mandated by use of the domicile test. In addition, the domi-
cile test does not adequately account for the constitutional concerns
that led to the creation of the Act of State doctrine. When formulat-
ing the doctrine in Sabbatino, the Supreme Court stressed that judicial
consideration of foreign expropriations could frustrate the foreign pol-
icy goals of the executive branch. 199 However, the domicile test does
not consider the expectations of the foreign government or other fac-
tors in the debtor-creditor relationship. It looks only at the operations
of the foreign branch. Hence, a U.S. court applying the domicile test
could ignore the foreign state's expectation of dominion over the sub-
ject matter at issue.20° This failure to account for the foreign govern-
ment's interests in the matter could hinder the executive branch's
ability to deal with that foreign government. 20 1 Therefore, the domi-
cile test might be a concrete rule of law, but it is a rule that operates at
the expense of overall American foreign policy.
Application of the complete fruition test could lead to an inconclu-
sive result. This test focuses on the terms of the deposit agreement,20 2
but if the Court were to reason that the telexes are not determinative
of where the debt was to be repaid, would the telexes be determinative
enough under the complete fruition test? This seems questionable.
Also, the rationale for the complete fruition test does not seem to ap-
ply in Wells Fargo. The test was meant to account more fully for the
expectations of the foreign state in an expropriation. 20 3 Judicial analy-
sis of the MAAB would not offend the Philippine government, accord-
ing to the telex received by WFAL's attorneys. 2°4 Finally, the
198. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
199. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964).
200. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F.Supp. 870, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (holding that courts can better analyze the interests of the foreign state by considering the
facts surrounding the debt in question). See generally, Recent Developments, Act of State. Treat-
ment of Foreign Defaults in Domestic Courts, 25 HARV. INT'L L. J. 195 (1984).
201. See Foreign Branch Expropriation, supra note 9, at 119-20.
202. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
203. Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F.Supp. 870, 884 (stating that consideration of factors surround-
ing the debt gives the court a better understanding of the foreign government's interests).
204. The Philippine government sent plaintiff a telex specifically disavowing any objection to
use of Citibank's non-Philippine assets to fulfill its obligation to WFAL. Wells Fargo II, supra
note 38, at 949. See also supra note 45.
1070 [Vol. 11:1039
Note, Wells Fargo v. Citibank
complete fruition test is limited to the text of the written agreement, a
restriction which leads to the same unrealistic analysis in which the
trial court engaged. 20 5 This limited approach would not completely
encompass factors that the parties failed to put into the written agree-
ment, including the true expectations of a foreign state.20 6 Thus, the
complete fruition test's narrow scope could lead a U.S. court to over-
look a foreign government's interests and to frustrate executive branch
foreign policy.
D. Potential Results Under Philippine Law
As noted, the incidents of the debt test would probably lead the
Court to find Manila to be the situs of the deposit. However, if the
Court found that the deposit was situated in Manila, it might not nec-
essarily decide in favor of Citibank/Manila. The Act of State doctrine
would not bar judicial review of the Philippine government's actions,
given that the Philippine government has given some consent to adju-
dication. 20 7 The Court would be free to apply its interpretations of
Philippine law if it wished to do so. Essentially, the Court could use
the same reasoning that the trial court applied in its first opinion. The
trial court found convincing the reasoning of WFAL's expert on Phil-
ippine law, 208 which concluded that the MAAB, which did require
Central Bank approval of transfers, did not apply to repayment of the
deposit with "non-Philippine assets" - assets carried on the books of
the bank's non-Philippine offices.2°9 Thus, under Philippine law intro-
duced in the litigation, so long as non-Philippine assets were used, Ci-
tibank/Manila could repay the deposit without Central Bank
approval. 210 Furthermore, since Philippine law treated Citibank's
world-wide operations as a single entity, the whole of Citibank, not
Citibank/Manila, might be obligated to WFAL.211 The Court could
conclude that WFAL could collect its deposit from any of Citibank's
assets without Citibank's violating the MAAB. Indeed, the trial court
found that Citibank "had not satisfied its good faith obligation to seek
the [Philippine] government's consent to use the assets booked at Ci-
205. See supra note 112.
206. Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F.Supp. at 884.
207. When the sovereign state has consented to adjudication in the courts of another state,
the justification for applying the Act of State doctrine is "significantly weaker." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 443, comment e (1986).
208. Wells Fargo II, supra note 38, at 948.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 948-49, (quoting the Philippine Supreme Court in National City Bank v. Posadas,
60 Phil. 630 (1934), aff'd, 296 U.S. 497 (1936)).
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tibank's non-Philippine offices." '212 Therefore, the Court could con-
strue the Central Bank's telex to WFAL to constitute such consent.
However, the Court may wish to remand this case and let the lower
court handle this analysis, which involves these unfamiliar issues of
Philippine law. In any event, WFAL might still prevail.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reasoning this note advocates would lead to the same outcome
that the trial and appellate courts reached. Citibank, which appears to
have resisted payment of the deposit so that it could set a precedent,
would still be required to make payment to WFAL. However, it does
so without creating the obstacle to commercial banking practices that
results from the lower courts' reasoning. Banks would not face the
legal uncertainties caused by the case nor would they have to circum-
vent these uncertainties with costly legal and business practices. This
approach would also affirm the superior status of the incidents of the
debt test, a methodology for approaching situs determination in Act of
State cases involving intangible assets that more accurately reflects the
basic tenets of the doctrine and the expectations of foreign govern-
ments. At the time of printing, the Supreme Court has not yet issued
its opinion in Wells Fargo.213 Perhaps it will not adopt this reasoning.
But if the Court avoids a fact-specific analysis of the case and under-
takes a thorough examination of the Act of State doctrine's mechanics,
however, both the parties in this case and the entire financial commu-
nity will be made better off in the long run.
212. Wells Fargo III, supra note 19, at 1455.
213. Oral argument was scheduled for Mar. 19, 1990. Hearing Scheduled, U.S.L.W.-Daily
Edition (Mar. 1, 1990).
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